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RECENT DECISIONS
In the instant case appellant contends that the title to the ring
was either wholly in him or that he had an insurable interest therein
as the ring had been presented to her as an "engagement ring," and
that it was no ordinary gift but at most a mere pledge or conditional
presentment, conditioned upon their consununating their engagement
to be married. The court maintained, however, that it is an estab-
lished principle that even a conditional gift confers a title to the object
given at the time of its delivery into the possession of the donee 14
and denied recovery on the ground that appellant had no insurable
interest at time of the loss.
It is felt that this decision, holding that a man does not have an
insurable interest in the engagement ring which he gives to his fiancee,
should not be followed. Such an implication must be based upon
facts and circumstances of the particular case with particular em-
phasis upon whether the gift was given as a conditional gift expressly
and which party, with or without fault, broke the engagement.
J. H. S.
INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-ANTI-AsIGNMENT AcT-FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS AcT.-Plaintiffs sue Federal Government for personal
injuries and property damage sustained when their auto was involved
in a collision with a United States Army truck. It is alleged that the
accident was caused by the negligence of the soldier operator of the
Federal vehicle. Plaintiff insurance company paid the amount of the
property damage sustained to the automobile in question under a
policy of indemnity insurance, which policy included coverage for
collision damage. The policy contained the standard subrogation
clause in the event that payments under it should be made to the
assured. Held, tort claims for damages resulting from collision be-
tween an auto and an Army truck are not within the statute pro-
hibiting the assignment of any claim upon the United States. Hill
v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
The precise point ruled on in the case was raised when the
United States attorney filed a motion to dismiss the insurance com-
pany's subrogation claim on the ground that the Tort Claims Act
does not authorize the maintenance of suits upon derivative claims,
and that such a claim is prohibited under the Anti-Assignment Act.1
The court held that the purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act is
to restrict voluntary assignments for the payment of claims against
the United States Government, so as to better keep a steady status
thereof, and thereby facilitate the undistracted consideration, deter-
24 Urbanus v. Burns, 300 Ill. App. 207, 20 N. E. 2d 869 (1939).
135 STAT. 411 (1908), as amended, 31 U. S, C. §203 (1940).
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mination and safe payment of such claims. The Act is altogether
for the protection of the Government.2 Since the insurance company
would have an equitable right of subrogation by operation of law even
without any express subrogation clause in the policy,3 there does not
exist a voluntary assignment such as was intended to be prohibited
by the Act. Also, "since in this suit, any recovery liquidating the
claim, and the enforcement of the subrogation claim would be simul-
taneous and with all the parties before the court, the Government
would be fully protected under the judgment and the amount of its
liability would remain unchanged."
The Tort Claims Act provides that within the bounds of the
Act the Government is liable "to the same claimants ... and to the
same extent" as a private person under like circumstances according
to the law of the state. Under the law of Texas, if the defendant
in this suit were an individual instead of the Government, the sub-
rogation claim in question could be maintained. 4
To date there have been but few decisions rendered on the ques-
tion of the right of an insurance company to sue the Federal Govern-
nient as subrogee under the Tort Claims Act, and there have been
no rulings by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals or by the United
States Supreme Court. The decisions of the District Courts, before
which the question has been brought, have been anything but uniform.
In Old Colony Insurance Co. v. United States,5 the court ruled that
the Federal Tort Claims Act does not authorize the maintenance of
suits upon derivative claims and refused to allow a recovery by the
insurance company. 6 In Rusconi v. United States,7 the court held
that the consent of the Government to be sued, being a relinquish-
ment of sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted, and the
insurance company's claim Was not allowed.8
In line with the ruling made in the Hill case, is a ruling in the
Eastern District of Wisconsin which allowed a recovery under the
Act by an insurance company on the ground that "subrogation means
substitution, not assignment or transfer." Subrogation is an act of
2 Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 U. S. 588, 81 L. ed. 822 (1937);
Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229 (1880).
3 The Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 32 L. ed,
788 (1889); The "Atlas," 93 U. S. 302, 23 L. ed. 863 (1876).
4 Sims v. Woods, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 130 S. W. 2d 424 (1939) ; Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., - Tex. Con. App. -,
239 S. W. 919 (1922).
5 74 F. Supp. 723 (S. D. Ohio 1947).
6 Accord, Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N. D. Tex. 1947);
McCasey v. United States (E. D. Mich.) (no opinion for publication).
74 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
s United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 85 L. ed. 1058 (1941). In
accord with the holding in the Rusconi case is the recent ruling in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, - F. Supp. - (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
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the law and a creature of equity depending not on contract but upon
principles of equity and justice.9
It is apparent that there will be no uniformity among the deci-
sions until a ruling on the question is made by a Circuit Court of
Appeals or by the United States Supreme Court, or until the Federal
Tort Claims Act is amended to specifically allow or disallow such
claims by an insurance company as subrogee.
J. B. McG.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION UNDER EMERGENCY RENT
ACT-COOPERATIVE OWNERSrIP.-The defendant tenant occupied
the apartment since 1941, having gone into possession under a lease
with the corporate owner. In July 1946 the lessor, corporation sold
the apartment house, assigning the defendant's lease to the new
owners. In 1947 a cooperative was formed and the property deeded
to it. At the time of the trial the entire building was under co-
operative ownership. The plaintiff acquired shares of stock in the
new company, plus a proprietary lease purporting to give her the
right to possession of the defendant's apartment for ninety-nine years
with the right to one hundred year renewals. The plaintiff then
served the defendant with statutory notice to quit and upon her re-
fusal to quit brought this action to evict her. In the trial court, with
a jury, the plaintiff was successful. The principal defense was to the
effect that the plaintiff was just another tenant, and not an owner
or landlord under the act 1 defining a landlord as "an owner, lessor,
sub-lessor, or other person entitled to receive rent for the use or
occupancy of any housing accommodation." Held, for the plaintiff, as
a landlord under the classification mentioned. Hicks v. Bigelow, 55
A. 2d 924 (Mun. Ct. of App. D. C. 1947).
The pivotal point in the case is the determination of the plain-
tiff's position as a landlord. The defendant's contention that she is
merely another tenant would seem to gain support from the common
law conception of a personal relationship between the landlord and
tenant,2 and the required presence of certain essentials such as per-
mission and consent of the landlord to the occupancy, subordination
to the landlord's title, reversion, and generally some contractual re-
lationship express or implied.3 However, the case is decided under
a statutory definition, and one which is quite common, being sub-
stantially the same as the New York Emergency Rent Laws applying
9 Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Wisc. 1947) ; accord,
Grace v. United States (Maryland) (no opinion for publication).
1D. C. CODE Supp. V. 45-1611(g) (1940).
2 WALSH, TnE LAw oF PROPERTY 233 (2d ed. 1937).
3 See Note, 51 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant § 2 (1947).
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